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INTRODUCTION FROM THE EDITORIAL BOARDS
The advancement of information and technology in this era has encouraged the editorial boards 
of Analisa Journal of Social Science and Religion to change some aspects of the journal for the better. 
The first changing is the name of the journal since 2015, from “Analisa Jurnal Pengkajian Masalah Sosial 
Keagamaan” to be “Analisa Journal of Social Science and Religion”. As a consequnce, there is alteration 
on the ISSN 1410-4350 to be 2502-5465. Furthermore, at this time, it is a must that a journal is published 
electronically, as it is stated in the rule issued by PDII LIPI (the Indonesian Institute of Science). Tehrefore, 
in 2015, Analisa started the electronic journal with E-ISSN 24443-3853, while the printed edition has been 
published since 1996 and continued until now. Along with the changing of the name, Analisa began the 
publication in English started vol.1.no.1 2016 as part of the preparation for being an international journal. 
There are various articles submitted to Analisa in the beginning of 2016. These include Islamic 
fundamentalism, terrorism, culture, Islam and Islamic education in Turkey. An article written by Tauseef 
Ahmad Parray talking about Islamism is placed as the opening of this volume. He argues that the incidence 
of 9/11 2011 in World Trade Center USA became a turning point for Western country to stereotype Islam 
as terrorist. Furthermore, after that tragedy Islam is perceived as fundamentalist religion, extremist, 
conservative Islam, radicalisms, and other negative stereotypes.  In this article, he suggests that it is 
necessary to evaluate the Western perspectives on Islam in which they labeled Islam as extremists. 
The next article is entitled “The Chronicle of Terrorism and Islamic Militancy in Indonesia” written 
by Zakiyah. This paper provides data and deep analysis on the series of bombing and terror happened in 
Indonesia from 2001 to 2012.  After the fall of President Soeharto in 1998, there were a series of bombing 
and terror in some part of the country which caused hundreds casualties and great number of property 
damages. This year was also a time for some extremists coming back to Indonesia after a long period of 
exile abroad. These extremist figures then began their activities in Indonesia and they also disseminated 
the radical ideology, establishing network, recruiting new members and preparing for terror and violent 
action.  Some of the terrorists and suspected of the bombing actions were indicated having connection 
with the Islamic radical group which means that there is an Islamic militancy in Indonesia
The radical ideology was also spread at prominent university in Yogyakarta Indonesia. This 
theme is discussed by Arifudin Ismail. He mentions that this ideology is not only spread by jihadists but 
also by some activists in certain campuses. For instance, there are some discussions and discussion groups 
existed in Gadjah Mada University, Sunan Kalijaga Islamic State University, Yogyakarta Muhammadiyah 
University, and Indonesia Islam University. In such activity, there is an indication that there is discussion 
on “the radical ideology”. He focused his study on the exclusive students movement in Gadjah Mada 
University especially related to how the religious doctrine (Islam) disseminated and perceived by students. 
Besides the discussion of the Islamism, terrorism and radical movement as the phenomena 
happened in Indonesia and in the world, this volume also offers other insights of Indonesia. Betty Mauli 
Rosa Bustamn explores the Minangkabau tradition. She describes in her article how the local people 
(Minangkabau) adopted Islamic values into their tradition from generation to the next generation. In 
this paper, it can be seen that Islam and local culture are living in harmony. In addition, Asep N Musadad 
talks about the assimilation and acculturation process between local traditions of Sundanese community 
with Islam. He describes that the harmony between them can be seen on the literature; there is a cultural 
change as a picture of how Islam and local tradition met and assimilated. Besides, in the folklore as he 
mentions that some incantations used by shaman (panayangan) contain some symbols of Islam
Besides being practiced in the local tradition as mentioned earlier, Islam in Indonesia is 
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transformed and disseminated through electronic media such as television; this can be read at the next 
article. Siti Solihati wrote a paper about how Islamic symbols are used by a soap opera broadcasted in a 
national television. In this article, she found that there are some ideologies embedded in such program 
namely; (1) ideology of materialistic-capitalist, (2) ideology of patriarchy, and (3) violent domination.  
Napsiah and her colleagues wrote an article about how the people living in surrounding 
the Merapi Mountain cope with the disaster especially when the eruption occurred and its aftermath. 
Community living in Pangukrejo village near the mountain helps each other dealing with their disaster 
related problems. They are hand in hand in re-building their villages without looking at their religious 
background. All people participate in those activities since they feel that Merapi is their home and their 
source of convenience and safety, therefore this honorable symbol should be preserved at all cost. They 
argue that the eruption is the destiny from God, thus it is undeniable fact. At that time, they were at 
the bottom level condition, so that to wake up from that situation they need to help each other (gotong 
royong).    
The last article in this volume is about the transformation of Islamic education at Imam Hatip 
School in Turkey. This paper is written by Mahfud Junaidi. He describes that the curriculum in this school 
aims to transfer the traditional norms based on the Islamic values. It is expected that by implementing 
Islam, this will contribute to the development of society and nation-state in Turkey. 
Please enjoy reading articles in this volume. 
        Semarang,   May 2016
        Editorial boards  
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A. INTRODUCTION
Islam is the main religion of the Turkish 
people, where 99.8% of the country’s population is 
nominally Muslims. Most Muslims in Turkey are 
Hanafite Sunnis, forming about 72%, and Alevis of 
the Syiah denomination, forming about 25% of the 
Muslim population. There is also a Twelver Syiah 
community, which forms about 3% of the Muslim 
population. However, Turkey is more recognized 
as secular than Islamic country. The secularization 
of Turkish society started during the last years of 
Ottoman Empire, and it was the most prominent 
and controversial feature of Kemal Pasha 
Atatturk’s reforms. Under his leadership, the 
caliphate—the supreme politico-religious office of 
Islam and the symbol of the sultan’s claim to world 
leadership of all Muslims—was abolished. The 
secular power reduced and eventually eliminated 
the religious authorities and functionaries. The 
religious foundations were nationalized, and 
religious education was restricted and for a time 
prohibited. The influential and popular mystical 
orders of the dervish brotherhoods (Tariqa) were 
also suppressed (“Islam in Turkey”, n.d.).
The Turkish government had more freedom 
to pursue policies attacking Islamic institutions. 
Under the guise of “cleansing Islam of political 
interference”, the educational system was 
completely overhauled. Islamic education was 
banned in favor of secular, non-dogmatic schools. 
Other aspects of religious infrastructure were also 
torn down. Religious endowments were seized and 
put under government control. Sufi lodges were 
forcefully shut down. All judges of Islamic law in 
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ABSTRACT
Imam Hatip schools have been a crucial and controversial Islamic education in 
a contemporary secular Turkey. The majority of Imam Hatip School students 
come from families who live and conduct their relations in accordance with 
Islamic norms and principles. Many conservative, religious-minded parents in 
rural and small town (in central and eastern Turkey) send their children after 
primary school to an Imam Hatip High school because this is the only school type 
in which the children can study Islamic subjects besides the general curriculum 
and the teachers are believed to impart traditional moral values. Many of those 
parents would, however, wish their children to pursue modern careers and find 
more prestigious and better-paid jobs than that of a modest preacher. Today Imam 
Hatip schools do not only produce Imams (leaders of prayer) and hatips (deliver 
khutba at every Friday sermon), but also design to cultivate religious sensibilities 
(dini hassasiyetler) in their students. The schools aim to heighten their student’s 
awareness of faith and promote the notion that religion should play a substantial 
role in the life of individuals and society. The most important is that Imam Hatip 
schools play an important role in Turkey’s pious community and make the country 
more Islamic. 
Keywords: Turkey, Imam Hatip School, religion, education, secular.
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the country were immediately fired, as all Shari’ah 
courts were closed (“How Atatturk”, n.d.).
 In addition, Atatürk’s attacks on Islam were not 
limited to the government, however, everyday life 
of the Turks was also dictated by Atatürk’s secular 
ideas:  (1) Traditional Islamic forms of headdress 
such as turbans and the fez were outlawed in favor 
of Western-style hats, (2) The hijab for women 
was ridiculed as a “ridiculous object” and banned 
in public buildings, (3) The calendar was officially 
changed, from the traditional Islamic calendar, 
based on the hijrah -Prophet Muhammad’s flight 
to Madinah- to the Gregorian calendar, based on 
the birth of Jesus Christ, (4) In 1932, the azan  -the 
Muslim call to prayer-  was outlawed in Arabic. 
Instead, it was rewritten using Turkish words and 
forced upon the country’s thousands of mosques, 
and (5) Friday was no longer considered part of 
the weekend. Instead, Turkey was forced to follow 
European norms of Saturday and Sunday being 
days off from work (“How Attaturk”, n.d.).  After 
all of these changes, Attaturk deleted the clause 
in the constitution which declared Islam as the 
official state religion. Islam had been replaced with 
Atatürk’s secular ideologies.
The most important, but at the same 
vulnerable, is secularism in general and secularism 
in education which is still disputable. Some 
scholars think that the secularization process is not 
completed in Turkey. A country cannot really be 
called secular when it pays every month the salary 
of 60,000 imams and dictates the content of their 
weekly sermon at Friday prayers, sometimes down 
to the last word. On one side, there are educated 
people who accepted secular agenda, and on the 
other side, there are uneducated people who live 
in villages and are believers (Giuli Alasania, Nani 
Gelovani, 2011, p. 39).
Fazlur Rahman (1982, p.92) explained that 
perhaps the most spectacular development in 
Islamic education in contemporary Islamic world 
has occurred in Turkey, where after a quarter of 
a century’s officially total ban, it resurrected itself 
through sheer public pressure. At last, with the 
introduction of democracy, i.e., a multiparty system 
in 1946, the Republican Party (Atatturk’s party) 
saw that the opposition party (the Democratic 
Party) might successfully do campaign on the issue 
of freedom of religious education. The Republican 
leader decided to undercut the opposition and 
established the Imam Hatip Schools to train imam 
and khatib, and Faculty of Theology (Ilahiyat 
Fakultesi) whithin Ankara University. The faculty 
was established as a scientific body and would be a 
torch of light like other scientific institutions.
Religion and education (Islamic education 
or Schooling Islam) in secular Turkey are an 
interesting issue due to an uneasy relationship 
of the state and religion. In this research, I try to 
explore this uneasy relationship of secular Turkish 
state with religion by investigating how religion 
has been dealt within the field of education. It is 
also interesting and important because it has had 
the largest period of independent existence among 
Muslim countries in recent history. This research 
focused on Imam Hatip School (Turkish: Imam 
Hatip Lisesi) as a transformative  institution of 
Islamic education in contemporary secular Turkey, 
with two research questions: 1) Why do Imam 
Hatip Schools still exist in contemporary secular 
Turkey?  and 2) How do the transformation of 
Imam Hatip Schools in contemporary secular 
Turkey ?
B. METHOD OF RESEARCH
 This research is a qualitative study with a 
historical approach centering on Turkey as the 
setting of the study. This study reads historical 
moments synchronically and diachronically. 
Synchronic reading of the historical events is 
meant to look at the historical moment within a 
particular time associated with many variables, 
for example, when looking at the development of 
religious education in a given context, it needs to 
be associated with other aspects such as political, 
social, cultural, and religious aspects. Meanwhile, 
diachronic reading of history is meant to look at 
certain historical events as a continuation of the 
previous events that will continue in the next 
period. Turkey is chosen in this study because it is 
a unique secular state which is different from other 
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secular states in Europe and has a population the 
majority of which embrace Islam by the percentage 
of around 99 percent. 
This research is related to phenomena or 
activities of human being in Islamic education. 
Therefore, the researcher uses observation 
to collect data and strengthen their validity. 
Observation is made  indirectly (nonparticipant) 
on the implementation of Islamic education 
conducted by Imam Hatip Schools. In addition, 
the researcher needs to take some advantages of 
the interview method. Interviews were conducted 
on people involved in Islamic education in Turkey, 
namely Imam Hatip School, as well as those who 
have adequate information and understanding 
about the issue of Islamic education in Turkey 
(Mehmet Toprak, Sulaiman, and Syeifi Kenan). 
This research uses a historical perspective, so the 
documentation is used to collect data from works 
or references related to the Islamic education 
(Imam Hatip schools) in Turkey. 
After the data are collected completely, 
they are then carried out to the data analysis. 
Descriptive data are analyzed qualitatively with 
an emphasis on primary sources supported by the 
results of interviews with key informants and field 
observations. The data are interpreted to find a 
new meaning of development and implementation 
of Islamic education (Imam Hatip Schools) in 
contemporary secular Turkey.
C. RESEARCH FINDINGS
1.    Islam in Contemporary Turkey 
Gibb (1978, p. 69) explained that “Islam is not 
only a body of religious doctrine but also a way of 
life with a long tradition behind it, extends to the 
whole range of Islamic doctrines and institutions, 
ethics, and rituals and also to the Islamic past”. 
Therefore, Islam in Turkey can be understood as 
Muslims civilization including of politic, social, 
economy, cultural, and education.
The people of Turkey are Muslims even though 
in 1928 Islam as the religion of the state was deleted 
from the constitution. This fact is well known 
enough though this deeply significant fact has 
been less widely appreciated. An understanding of 
the modern Turks as Muslims has been little bit 
late to be cultivated, either by western students 
or by Islamic peoples. The people of Turkey are 
not only Muslims, but also, for many centuries, 
have been of all Muslims (W. C. Smith, 1957, p. 
165). Whereas Islam had formed the identity of 
Muslims within Ottoman Empire, secularism was 
seen as molding the new Turkish nation and its 
citizens. The interaction between secularism and 
Islam plays an important role in normative and 
ethnic conflict, culture and politics, remembrance 
and representation of the past, and the formation 
of new social movement in Turkey (Yavus, 2014, 
p. 7).
In contemporary Turkey, Directorate of 
Religious Affairs, known as Diyanet, is the 
government body representing and directing all of 
Sunni Islam in Turkey. Created in 1924, a year after 
the Republic of Turkey was formed, the Diyanet is 
enshrined in 136 of the Turkish Constitution. The 
Diyanet is huge and powerful. Operating under the 
Prime Minister, it employs about 100,000 (from 
muftis to imams in mosques). All Sunni clergies 
are salaried as civil servant of Diyanet. (The Myth 
of Turkish Secularism, 2013).  In addition, the state 
is one of the main producers of religious discourse 
in Turkey, providing free areas of development 
for mosques to be built, paying the expenses of 
water and electricity, and educating and paying 
preachers. Moreover, the state shapes the religious 
discourse through standardized Friday sermons, 
fatwas, religious publications, and to the state 
media, and non-Muslim are legally restricted in 
their religious freedoms. This attitude of the state 
towards religion, especially towards Islam, can be 
understood only in a historical framework (Bekim 
Agai, 2007, p. 150)
Until the present day, the Diyanet writes all 
the sermons for its clergy, but reportedly now it 
sometimes allows them to write their own though 
their contents are controlled. The Diyanet also 
controls all mosques (80,000). In the educational 
sector, it is responsible for 4,322 Quranic courses 
throughout the country and provides the series 
of publications dealing with educational matters. 
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The Diyanet assumes the task of including Islam 
in the project of national homogenization as well 
as exercising state control over private forms of 
Islamic activities (Bekim Agai, 2007, p. 150). The 
nation of laicism had changed. Turkish laicism 
means the control of religious expression through 
the state. By controlling religious tasks, the state 
hoped to depoliticize religion and integrate it into 
its civilizing project.
The new constitution of 1982 consequently 
strengthened the role of Islam in Turkey. 
National historiography was revised, and Islam 
was presented as an outstanding national trait of 
the Turks, as well as being a source of social and 
moral stability. The curriculum of state schools 
was adapted to religious demand, obligatory 
religious courses were introduced, and the theory 
of evolution was banned from schoolbooks. Even 
today, there are varied levels of state involvement 
in the religious sphere (Bekim Agai, 2007, p. 150). 
Would the U.S., or any Western country, be termed 
“secular” if it funded a huge Christian government 
agency that employed all Christian clergy and 
controlled their sermons? Obviously not.
In both theory and practice, the Turk’s version 
of Islam Today is different from other Muslim 
people. It is, we believe, of major significance 
in itself if we shall presently try carefully to 
understand. Also, its very differentiation from 
the others is significant, and this too needs 
clarification. It is, of course, related to the fact that 
the historical context is different, both present and 
past. Quite a part from religious interpretation, 
the Turks stand out from among other Muslims 
both for their current activity and development, 
their revolutionary prosecution of modern life, 
and for their past role in Islamic history, especially 
in recent centuries. As with other Muslims, 
their understanding of Islamic history and their 
participation in it have been markedly distinctive 
(W. C. Smith, 1957, p. 166). 
Islam in Turkey is distinguished by 
considerable diversity, both in ideational content 
and in institutional forms. In political expression 
and organization, Islam is not restricted to one 
part and it is even more socially and culturally 
developed than it is politically. Turkish Islam is 
distinguished by a high degree of institutional 
differentiation from secular counterparts in 
separate trade unions, business associations, 
foundation, education, and media activities. Some 
cultural and intellectual Muslims milieus display 
a high level of vitality and innovation, compared 
to the stereotypical products of much of political 
Islam. 
A survey entitled “Religious Life in Turkey” was 
conducted by the Presidency of Religious Affairs or 
Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı on religion and religious 
habits in Turkey. For Diyanet’s survey, 21,632 
people were interviewed across the country which 
has a population over 76 million, and 50.9 percent 
of them were women. The majority of them, at 77.5 
percent, followed the Hanafi madhhab or school of 
law interpreting religious rules while 11.1 percent 
were Shafii and 0.1 percent followed the Hanbali 
School. One percent responded that they followed 
the Ja’fari sect of Shia Islam and 6.3 percent 
described themselves as followers of none of these 
sects while 2.4 were not aware of his or her sect. 
(“Turkish Muslims are more Pious as They Age”, 
2014).
When asked whether they believe in God, 98.7 
percent of participants responded that they believe 
God’s existence and oneness, and 0.8 percent only 
replied either that they doubted his existence but 
still believed, or were doubtful of his existence 
and did not believe in God at all. Moreover, a 
majority of participants said that they accepted 
all revelations in Quran as accurate and valid for 
people of all ages while only 1 percent expressed 
doubt, and less than half of interviewees said they 
were able to read Islam’s holy book Quran in its 
original (Arabic), while others said they could 
not. Over 95 percent of the participants believe in 
the existence of angels, satan, and jinns. A large 
majority of the interviewees expressed their faith 
in the day of resurrection and judgment and only 
0.9 did not believe in resurrection and being held 
accountable for their sins and good (“Turkeys 
Muslims more Pious as They Age”, 2014).
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The survey shows that more than half of those 
performing prayers five times a day live in rural 
areas while 39.4 percent live in cities. Women 
perform daily prayers more than men and there 
is a correlation between the age and frequency 
of performing prayers. People observe obligatory 
prayers more as they age according to the survey. 
Turkey’s Muslims above 65 are most likely to 
perform daily prayers regularly while only 26.2 
percent of Muslims between the ages of 18 and 
24 regularly perform obligatory prayers. Another 
interesting finding in the survey is that the higher 
the level of education of Muslim individuals have, 
the more they are inclined to skip daily prayers. 
The frequency of performing daily prayers is the 
highest among illiterate Muslims. The highest 
rate of attendance to prayers is for Friday prayers, 
a prayer that needs to be performed with a 
congregation and is obligatory exclusively for men. 
Over 57 percent of interviewees said they always 
attend Friday prayers and only 7.2 percent said they 
had never attended the Friday prayers (“Turkeys 
Muslims more Pious as They Age”, 2014). 
The survey also examined Muslim’s observance 
of fasting and giving zakat, a type of almsgiving 
obligatory for all Muslims considered wealthy 
enough. Over 83 percent perform fasting as long as 
they are healthy while 2.5 percent said they never 
fast. The rate of women was higher among those 
regularly fasting. Those giving zakat annually are 
in majority while only 1.1 percent said they did not 
give zakat although they could afford to.
On the matter of performing a religious 
pilgrimage, a pillar of Islam compulsory for every 
able-bodied follower who can afford it, only 6.6 
percent of interviewees performed the pilgrimage 
to Mecca and Medina known as Hajj. A large 
number of interviewees plan to perform it as soon 
as they can afford while a very small percent said 
they preferred to help the poor instead of spending 
money on a pilgrimage. A considerable majority of 
interviewees said they recite prayers at any time of 
day without any reason while more than half recite 
prayers to show their gratitude to God. The rest of 
interviewees recite prayers only when they face a 
problem, an ordeal (“Turkeys Muslims more Pious 
as They Age”, 2014). 
Based on the survey, more than 71 percent 
of women interviewed said they covered their 
head while going out though they were not asked 
whether they regularly wear a headscarf or other 
forms of covering and 27.2 percent said they did 
not cover. Wearing headscarves or other items to 
cover the head is more common in rural parts of 
Turkey according to the survey.  The main reason 
women cited for wearing a headscarf was that they 
believed it is an obligation of Islam. This reason 
was followed by family’s pressure, adherence 
to customs and societal pressure respectively 
(“Turkeys Muslims more Pious as They Age”, 
2014).
It can be concluded that the religiosity of 
Turkish Muslim is good enough. Therefore, it is 
understandable that “more than anything else into 
modernist Turkey, convinced me that Islam has 
a very deep root in the hearts of the real Turkish 
people, nor can, indeed, be divorced from their 
mind” (Javad Saeed, p. 165). A country cannot 
really be called secular when it pays, every month, 
the salaries of Imams and dictates the contents of 
their weekly sermons at Friday prayers. Islam is 
the most controversial issue to divide the Turkish 
republic since 1923. On one side, there were 
educated people who accepted secular agenda, and 
on the other side, there were uneducated people 
who lived in villages and were believers (Giuli 
Alasania, Nani Gelovani, 2011, p. 39)
The facts show us that Islam is still alive in 
Turkey, and even they claimed that 99 percent of 
Turkish citizens are Muslims. In addition, although 
the state recently still embraces a secular ideology, 
the religious life of people is similar to other people 
in Islamic countries, either in worshiping or in 
practicing other Islamic cultures. 
In Turkey, the state shapes Islam on different 
levels. Today one key actor is the directorate for 
Religious Affairs or Diyanet. With about 100,000 
employees, from Muftis to imams in the mosques, 
all state paid, it controls the religious service in 
70,000 mosques and shapes the religious discourse 
throgh standardized Friday sermon, fatwas, 
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religious publications, and access to the state 
media. In the educational sector it is responsible 
for 4,322 Quranic courses throughout the country 
and provides a series of publications dealing with 
educational matters. The Directorate assumes the 
task of including Islam in the project of national 
homogenization as well as exercising state control 
over private forms of Islamic activities. According 
to the constitution, it is the Directorate’s duty to 
ensure national unity. The creation of a Sunni-
state Islam is the paradoxical consequence of 
Turkish laicism (Bekim Agai, 2007,  pp. 153-4). 
Such an approach had to ensure that all Turkish 
pupils learned the one and only “enlightened 
state-version of Islam” whilst undermining 
Islamic influence outside of state control and the 
potential creation of alternatives forms of Islamic 
belongings.
Though Turkey is often potrayed as very 
secular and laicist, different Islamic groups 
found ways to transmit their forms of Islamic 
knowledge in Turkey. The Islamic brotherhoods 
were outlawed, but some continued to operate 
in hidden forms. Some underground medresses 
were maintained, while Qur’anic courses were 
held in private. The most important development 
during the repressive period of the early Republic, 
however, was the formation of new forms of 
religious communitis, the cemaats. These groups 
attempted to maintain and transmit their Islamic 
ideas under the state’s repressive policies. Cemaat 
can be defined as the combination of a specific 
discourse with certain forms of social relations. 
Unlike the sufi brotherhood,  the cemaat has no 
formal act to bestow membership. The cemaats 
were critical of the state’s religious education and 
developed their own forms of Islamic teaching 
(Bekim Agai, 2007,  pp. 153-4).
We  have seen how strongly and 
comprehensively the state involved in religious 
teaching, and how it causes traditional patterns 
of classical Islamic education disappear.  The 
followers of Said Nursi, Nurcu movement, 
(Fethullah Gullen group) are a specific result of 
these developments which have made Turkey a 
unique case in Islamic world.
The political scientist Hakan Yafuz, as cited 
by Ozgur, argues that “Turkish Islam” is different 
from the Arab and Persian Islam because of 
its production of cultural norms and modes of 
thought as related to religion, faith, personal life, 
ritual practices, and religious holidays, covering 
a whole spectrum from social mores to personal 
ones and the interpretations of Islamic principles. 
Since they are contextualized in a setting where 
“Turkish Islam” is the norm, it is conceivable 
that the communities around Imam Hatip 
schools advocate a more “liberal” form of Islam 
(Ozgur, 2012, pp. 189-190). Religion, either as an 
expression of individual piety or as an institutional 
organization, could not be suppressed or ignored.
2.   Social and Political Background
Turkey is a country located in Europe, Asia, and 
Midle East. Ninety nine percent of the population 
of Turkey is Muslim. Turkey is the only country in 
which Islam is the major religious community, but 
is constitutionally secular guaranteeing complete 
freedom of worship to non-Muslim. In addition, 
the present conservative government, has Islamic 
origins, is engaged in reform, with the goal of 
Turkey joining of European Union (EU) (Mustafa 
Cinoglu, 2006, pp.676-687).
Turkey is a parliamentary democracy with 
multi-party system. Major parties are defined as 
political parties that recieved 10 % of the votes in 
the latest general election (July, 22,  2012) and/ 
or represented in parliament. Minor parties are 
defined as political parties that have fulfilled the 
requirements of the Supreme Election Committee 
((Yuksek Secim Kurulu (YSK) in Turkish). Parties 
represented in Parliament now are:  (1)  Adalet 
ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development 
Party), (2)  Cumhuriyat Halk Partisi (Republican 
Party), (3) Milliyetci Hareket Partisi (Nationalist 
Party), (4) Halklan Demokratik Partisi (People’s 
Democratic Party), and (5) Bans ve Democrasi 
Partisi  (“List of Political”, n.d.).
 Social mobility has increased since the 
emergence in the 1950s of a multi-party 
participative nature of policy and greater economic 
development. The neglected villagers who clung to 
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their traditional ways as a result of one-party city 
center modernization have come to participate 
in the educational system at a greater rate than 
ever before. The changed policy in the agricultural 
sector has also helped the peasants to be more 
mobile and economically strong.  
Although democratic Turkey  is  over 
whelmingly Muslim, for almost eight decades 
its legal and political system have shown a 
deep seated fear of Islam as political force. The 
government monitors and regulates how Islam is 
preached and practiced.  In recent years, One of 
many restrictions on religion, on December 1981, 
the Prime Ministry issued a list of regulations 
which required all personal and students in 
institutions of higher education to wear “clothing 
which is compatible with Atatturk’s revolution 
and principles” not cover they heads while in 
the institution. Many people saw the decision 
as a reflection of the nation’s partisan politics. 
The Republican people’s party called the verdict 
a “triumph of justice,” while the Justice and 
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi), 
a group with roots in Islam, defended the scarves as 
a matter of individual rights. Consequently, many 
families sent their children abroad for university 
education. The Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdogan, 
said that he had two daughters and they were 
going to university in the United States because 
of the head scarf problem. On February 9, 2008, 
Turkey’s parliament approved a constitutional 
amendment that lifted the ban on Islamic 
headscarves in universities. Prior to this date, the 
public ban on headscarves officially extended to 
students on university campus throughout Turkey. 
Nevertheless, some faculty permitted students to 
wear head coverings in class. On June 5, 2008, 
Turkey’s constitutional Court annulled the 
parliament’s proposed amendment intended to lift 
the headscarf ban, ruling that removing the ban 
would run counter to official secularism. The last 
debates were solved in such a way: students can 
have headscarves but not their teachers. (http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
muslim/portraits/turkey.html).
In politics, it is important to recognize that 
although the Justice and Development Party 
(Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi/AKP), the 
ruling party now, can be regarded as a Muslim 
government, it controls power within a secular 
state. Since the late 1990s, scholars have been 
examining the practices of secular states and 
challenging some of the established categories 
used to understand and asses secularism. There 
has been a widespread definition that secularism 
is the separation of religion from the policy and 
practices of the state. Recent scholars, however, 
finds this definition too narrow and argues that 
secularism  seeks not so much to banish religion 
from the public domain, but to reshape the form 
it takes, the subjectivities it endorses, and the 
epistemological claims it can make (Ozgur, 2012, 
p.5-6.).  This broader definition better captures the 
ways in which religion and state interact in Turkey.
The AKP’s politics and discourse are 
characterized by conservative democracy, which 
claims to combine the traditional lifestyle inspired 
by Islam with the Western liberal values that 
are based on the free market and globalization. 
The AKP’s orientation, which is based on the 
contradictory attitudes of Islam and the West, is 
quite different from traditional Islamic discourse. 
After the political victory of the AKP, the debates 
about the relationship between Islam and functions 
of Imam Hatip schools significantly increased. 
These schools, after the 1970s, became the sources 
of the grassroots of Islamist parties (Interview 
with Mehmet Toprak, September 25, 2014). There 
is ample evidence that, though they might not be 
attempting to turn Turkey into an Islamic state, 
members of the AKP are prepared and interested 
in evolving the country into a state that is more 
sympathetic to religiously conservative Turks.  
Secularization in Turkey is a product of the 
interaction and influence of many diverse factors, 
such as pro-French policy is redundant of the 
sultans, intensive and massive campaigns of 
people who love to imitate the West and Western-
educated elite to take over institutions and 
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Western values . Coupled with diplomatic pressure 
continuously from European countries since the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. And the most 
important among the causes of the change is the 
military defeats and insults suffered by soldiers 
of Osmaniyah in the eighteenth century and the 
nineteenth, the increase of Western countries in 
the fields of politics and economics and a sharp 
decline of empire Osmaniah  (Al Attas, 1988, p. 9).
Turkish secularism is based on the radical 
Jacobin laicism that aimed to transform society 
through the power  of the state  and eliminate 
religion from the public sphere. The Jacobin faith 
“in primacy of politics and in ability of politics 
to reconstitute society”  guided Mustafa Kemal 
and his associates (Yavus, 2014). The aim of the 
project was to modernize Turkey, give it a Western 
outlook, and make it compatible with modern, 
Western civilization, regardless of the difficulties 
this might cause for the populace (Bekim Agai, 
2007, p.151).
Although Turkey was secularized at the 
official level, religion remained a strong force 
at the popular level. After 1950, some political 
leaders tried to benefit from popular attachment 
to religion by espousing support for programs and 
policies that appealed to the religiously inclined. 
Such efforts were opposed by most of the state 
elite, who believed that secularism was an essential 
principle of Kemalist ideology. This disinclination 
to appreciate religious values and beliefs gradually 
led to a polarization of society. The polarization 
became especially evident in the 1980s as a new 
generation of educated but religiously motivated 
local leaders emerged to challenge the dominance 
of the secularized political elite. These new leaders 
have been assertively proud of Turkey’s Islamic 
heritage and generally have been successful at 
adapting familiar religious idioms to describe 
dissatisfaction with various government policies. 
By their own example of piety, prayer, and 
political activism, they have helped to spark a 
revival of Islamic observance in Turkey. By 1994 
slogans promising that a return to Islam would 
cure economic ills and solve the problems of 
bureaucratic inefficiencies had enough general 
appeal to enable avowed religious candidates to 
win mayoral elections in Istanbul and Ankara, 
the country’s two largest cities (“Islam in Turkey”, 
n.d.).
Turkey’s “laïcité” does not call for a strict 
separation of religion and the state, but describes 
the state’s stance as one of “active neutrality.” 
Turkey’s actions in relation to religion are carefully 
analyzed and evaluated through the Presidency of 
Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı). The 
duties of the Presidency of Religious Affairs are “to 
execute the works concerning the beliefs, worship, 
and ethics of Islam, to enlighten the public about 
their religion, and to administer the sacred 
worshipping places” (“Secularism in Turkey”, n.d.). 
Religion is mentioned on the identity documents 
and there is an administration called “Presidency 
of Religious Affairs” or Diyanet which exploits 
Islam to legitimize sometimes State and manages 
77,500 mosques. This state agency, established 
by Atatturk (1924), finances only Sunni Muslim 
worship (“Islam in Turkey”, n.d.). 
This fact indicates that secularization does 
not necessarily mean that religion loses its 
ability to influence political behavior. Among 
the many factors which affect political responses 
toward modernization, religion is undoubtedly 
an important one. Gibb says that we must not 
think of all Westernizers as secular minded and 
antireligious, even if it is true that a great number 
of the educated neglect the observances of religion 
(H.A.R Gibb, 1978, p. 51).  In contemporary 
Turkey, the separation of Islam from the polity or 
secularism is not complete success. It is recognized 
the significance of Islam’s role in Turkish history 
and it is an essential part of the individual’s life of 
Turkish. 
So far, Turkey is still a secular country. It may 
be the way to maintain Ataturk Reforms or to 
have similarities among countries in the European 
Union, but Islamic movements find a conducive 
position. The model of secularism in Turkey is 
different from that in Europe. Turkey recently 
led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the third term as 
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the Prime Minister since 2003 (“Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan”, n.d.), gives attention to Islam. Erdogan 
was a graduate of Imam Hatip School, and he is 
a Muslim and religious person. Therefore, he has 
a mission to support Islamic movements through 
many ways including policy of National Education 
System, especially related to Islamic schools. 
However, he is still careful to implement such a 
policy in order to run smoothly. He performs an 
integrated ideology of secular and Islam.
This analysis demonstrates how the fortunes 
of Imam Hatip schools have risen and fallen 
with the shifting fortunes of the Islamic political 
movement. Since the early 1920s, Imam Hatip 
schools have been at the center of a conflict between 
the secularist and Islamist forces in Turkey and 
have been debated within the larger context of 
social and political issues. Imam Hatip schools 
are unique institutions in the religious education 
experience of secular Turkey.
3.     The Development of Imam Hatip Schools
Each historical period has the education 
relevant to it. As a mirror, education reflects all 
social changes. No essential changes are possible 
without deep changes in education. Traditional 
education, transmitted through generations, was 
spread for a long time in the early Turkish history. 
Traditions were preserved and developed in the 
theocratic Ottoman Empire, where Sultan was 
Caliph and civic and spiritual powers.
The Westernization and secularization 
processes among Turks started much earlier than 
Republic and Atatturk’s time, it was as early as 
in the late medieval Ottoman state. First of all 
the process was revealed in education which was 
crucial for economic and social changes. The 
secularization of education was set up on agenda; 
however the longstanding traditions of religious 
education were still very strong and viable (Giuli 
Alasania, Nani Gelovani, 2011).
According to the law issued on 3 March, 1924, 
479 medresses were closed, and also religious 
courses were deleted from the curricula of the 
public schools. Such a situation lasted until 1949. 
Education and curriculum contents in medresses 
did not go through important changes for centuries 
except some minor modifications, and thus, 
medresses in general remain solidly traditional 
institutions, which end up loosing their connection 
with the modern period and its realities, and the 
needs of the society when entering the 19th century 
( Seyfi Kenan, 2009,p. 521). 
Additionally, the medresses established by old 
Turks are degenerated ruins, unable to be reformed 
in the light of modern academic mentality (Bekim 
Agai, 2007, p. 150). Syefi Kenan  (2009) said that 
each school or any kind of educational organization 
emerges and survives based on satisfying certain 
needs and expectations of its own society. 
However, when they fail to meet those needs and 
demands, society will start searching for new 
models of schooling and education. This is what 
happened in the late of 19th century. There was no 
course for the teaching of religion available in the 
public school system for fourteen years between 
1935 and 1948. Religious education moved to the 
private realm for a while, and the young generation 
received their religious education in informal 
settings, mostly from their parents at home, 
sometimes from imams, old medresses graduates, 
or scholars at mosques. There was also a plethora 
of religious books written by the prominent experts 
of religion in the period to teach Islam to the young 
generation as part of the activities of informal 
religious education during these silent years (Seyfi 
Kenan, 2009, p.532).
Moreover, it is important to note that 
the fourth article of the Law of Unification of 
Education required to open, at the same time 
Imam Hatip mekteps  in 29 centers as secondary 
schools, and reestablish a Theological Faculty 
in Darul Funun in Istanbul. The new Republic 
offered a new modern of religious education at 
both secondary and higher level replacing the 
medreses education, but this attempt could not 
succeed well in the following years. The number 
of Imam Hatip schools decreased gradually, and 
by 1927, there were only two schools surviving, 
one in Istanbul and the other in Kutahya, due to 
a lack of students. Nonetheless, informal religious 
education continued under the supervision of 
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the Presidency of Religious Affairs, for instance, 
in limited number of Quranic Schools (Darrul 
kurra) to preserve the tradition of recitation and 
memorization of the Quran. This Quranic schools 
(Kuran kursu) still exist today in certain numbers 
for religious education under the supervision of 
the same Presidency, admitting students only 
after they have completed the eighth grade in 
compulsory primary schools (Seyfi Kenan, 2009, 
pp.530-531).
The first phase of Imam Hatip schools was 
brief and ill fated. Early Imam Hatip schools 
bore several elements that resembled medreses. 
The schools attracted students and teachers from 
shuttered medreses and taught from a curriculum 
that combined secular and Islamic subjects. 
During the 1923-1924 academic year, Imam Hatip 
schools enrolled 2,258 students and employed 
approximately 300 teachers. By the 1926-1927 
academic year, the number of Imam Hatip school 
students had decreased to 278, and the number 
of teachers had decreased to 10. The schools 
were closed in the 1929-1930 academic year. The 
government closed Imam Hatip schools because 
the ministers themselves -not the students- had 
lost interest in them (Ozgur, 2012, p.35).
The government in power, which was 
Atatturk’s Republican People’s Party, decided to go 
ahead with a new announcement in September 1, 
1947 amid diverse public opinions, and to initiate 
a formal religious education program again after 
a long period of official silence to train teachers 
of religion, qualified imams and hatips under the 
supervision of the Ministry of National Education. 
 Intellectuals and politicians from diverse 
political and ideological backgrounds debated in 
those years whether religious education violates 
the principles of secularism that should provide 
religious education if the state does not have it 
since Islam does not have a mosque bureaucracy 
or hierarchy like a church in the West, and how this 
education  can be provided (Ozgur, 2012, p.533). 
Besides, intellectuals and politicians were also 
concerned about the fact that if the state does not 
provide religious instruction, then people would 
get immersed in superstition and wrong beliefs, 
and fanaticism might spread all over the country. 
Ihsan Olgun, a representative in his speech in 
1948 in the National Assembly, affirmed that most 
of the imams and hatips/preachers in the period 
were unqualified or poorly educated in religious 
matters (Ozgur, 2012, p.533).
In 1949, in a relatively weak response to 
grassroots demands, the government announced 
the opening of Imam Hatip courses (Imam Hatip 
Kurslari) in ten cities. The ten month program 
included topics such as  Qur’an, Hadits, and 
Islamic History. Lessons were fifty minutes long 
and ran from nine o’clock in the morning till 12:50 
in the afternoon.  Their enrollment was limited, 
they graduated only fifty students after their first 
year.  It is unlikely that the courses were perceived 
as a serious effort to satisfy the need for more 
religious functionaries ((Iren Ozgur, 2012). On 
13, October, 1951 the government decided to open 
new religious schools. The first schools known 
as Imam Hatip schools (Imam Hatip Liseleri) 
started to function in Ankara, Adana, Istanbul, 
Isparta, Konya, and Kayseri in 1951-52. The total 
number of students at these schools was 876. Later 
the number of students at these schools increased 
parallel with the increasing number of schools 
(Alasania,  Gelovani, 2011).
The historical analysis of the Imam Hatip 
schools in their reinstated form could be divided 
into four periods. They are (1) 1951 – 1973, a period 
of nascence and growth, (2) 1973 – 1997, a period 
of transformation and progress, (3) 1997 – 2002, 
a period of weakening and decline, and (4) 2002 
to the present, a period of resurgence and renewal 
(Alasania, Gelovani, 2011).
The period from 1951 to 1973 witnessed 
the steady expansion of the Imam Hatip School 
system as different government made concession 
to Islamic sentiment in the country. The number 
of Imam Hatip schools increased from 7 to 72 and 
the number of students from 876 to 36,378. The 
increasing in the number of Imam Hatipp schools 
brought forth the opening of higher Islamic 
Institutes (Yuksek Islam Enstituler) in the late 
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of 1950s. Between 1951 and 1973, Imam Hatip 
school students came predominantly from similar 
socio-economic background. The majority came 
from poor and lower-middle-class families who 
were either villagers or recent migrants to cities. 
Some stayed with relatives, while others stayed 
at dormitories or the courtyards of mosques 
(Alasania, Gelovani, 2011).
The period between 1973 and 1997 was one 
of growth and progress for the Imam Hatip 
schools.  During this time, successive governments 
undertook initiatives to transform Imam Hatip 
schools from vocational schools into more 
mainstream educational institution. For the first 
time, the schools began to cater to both male and 
female students who wanted to pursue university 
degrees in nonreligious fields. In these two decades, 
the number of Imam Hatip schools and students 
increased significantly. The growth of Imam Hatip 
schools during this period reflected advancement 
in Islamist politics, (Alasania, Gelovani, 2011).
During the 1974-75 school year, the number of 
students attending to the Imam Hatip high schools 
grew to 48,895. This number subsequently grew to 
200,300 by 1980-81. In addition, females gained 
the right of entry to Imam Hatip high schools 
in 1976. The proliferation of Imam Hatip high 
schools is often cited as the effect of the National 
Salvation Party’s membership of a number of 
coalitions with Nationalist Front governments. In 
October 1972, the Islamists were allowed to form 
National Salvation Party (1972-1981). The party’s 
goals were compulsory secondary education, 
including religion in curricula, and restoration 
of the caliphate. Their voters were lower-middle 
class. The party was against of the common 
market and exhorted for closer relations with 
Muslim countries. They believed that the Ottoman 
Empire was destroyed by Westernization process 
and alienation from Islam. Regardless of their 
anti-secular agenda after the elections in 1973, 
during the 70s Islamic parties were frequently in 
coalition with secularists. As the result, Islamists 
were promoted to the high positions and number 
of mosques, or Imam Hatip schools, courses of 
Qur’an or related personnel increased (Alasania, 
Gelovani, 2011).
Two decisions of education and training have 
a positive effect on the future of the Imam Hatip 
schools. One decision (number 394, August 25, 
1974) introduced Qur’an, Arabic Language, and 
religion courses into the Junior High school 
curriculum. The other decision (number 632, 
November 28, 1975) recognized the Imam Hatip 
school’s equivalency to regular high school 
(Imam Hatip school diplomas) since then having 
read “Senior High and Imam Hatip schools”. 
Consequently, Imam Hatip school graduates 
became eligible for admission to national 
universities. Since 1975, the Imam Hatip school 
graduates have successfully entered diverse 
majors in the national universities: Theology, 
Education, Economics, Public Administration, 
Engineering, Medicine, Law and Political Sciences 
(Alasania, Gelovani, 2011, pp. 35-50). In 1989, 
according to the University Exam Centre statistics, 
22% of  Imam Hatip Schools applicants were 
admitted to universities. In the 1980s  and 1990s, 
Anatolian Imam Hatip schools placed many of 
their graduates into prestigious professional 
faculties in leading Turkish universities. During 
this decade, approximately 80 percent of the 
graduations from Kertal and Kadikoy Anatolian 
Imam Hatip schools in Istambul and Tevfix Ileri 
Anatolian Imam Hatip school in Ankara received 
high score in the university entrance exams and 
enrolled in a wide range faculties. Moreover, the 
success of these Imam Hatip schools graduates 
is accountable for the enhancement in the appeal 
and standing of Imam Hatip schools in the eyes of 
many religiously conservative Turks. Throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s, the schools had influx of 
new students.  In the 1982-1983 academic year, 
there were 374 Imam Hatip schools enrolling 219, 
931 student’s. In 1996-1997 academic year there 
were 601 Imam Hatip schools enrolling 511,502 
students. (Ozgur, 2012, p.50). The period from 
1997 to 2002 was weakening and decline of Imam 
Hatip schools because of the escalating tensions 
between the Islamist Refah Partisi (RP).  Also, it 
was due to the secularist forces in society leading to 
the 1997 political crisis.  Since their rise to power, 
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members of Refah Partisi had encouraged several 
Islamic practices that had especially provoked the 
military, such as interest free banking, veiling in 
state institutions, and public prayers. As a direct 
result of the crisis, the number of Imam Hatip 
school students decreased from 511,502 to 77,392 
between 1997 and 2002 (Ozgur, 2012, pp. 52-53).
Research indicates that between the years of 
1993 and 2000, prospective students registered 
at Imam Hatip high schools primarily to receive 
religious tutoring alongside a more general 
education (“Imam Hatip School”, n.d.). In addition, 
research shows enrolment at Imam Hatip high 
schools was based solely on the student’s decision. 
The third proposed factor in the rise in popularity 
of Imam Hatip schools is the admission of female 
students in 1976. By 1998, almost 100,000 females 
attended Imam Hatip high schools, making 
up almost half of all students. This statistic is 
particularly revealed because women are not 
eligible to become either priests or ministers 
(“Imam Hatip School”, n.d.).  By 1995, 13,826 
females compared to 29,103 males had graduated 
from Imam Hatip schools (Alasania, Gelovani, 
2011, p.43).
However, the introduction of eight years of 
compulsory education in 1997 has seen a sudden 
decline in the popularity of Imam Hatip schools. 
In 1999, the reclassification of Imam Hatip schools 
as “vocational schools” meant that, although more 
options had been made available to graduates, 
attaining places at prestigious university courses 
became more difficult. By requiring that all eight 
compulsory years of schooling be spent under the 
same primary-school roof, middle schools were 
abolished. Children could not enter vocational 
schools (one of them is the Imam Hatip school) 
until the ninth grade (rather than the sixth, as 
before) (Andrew Finkel, 2012), and 2002 to the 
present, a period of resurgence and renewal of 
Imam Hatip schools. In this period Imam Hatip 
schools have been regaining the status, enrollment 
levels, and overall capabilities of previous decade. 
Although they leg behind the figures of the late 
1990s, the enrollment figures have risen from 
71,100 to 235,000 in 2011 (Ozgur, 2012, p.63). 
Following the reforms of March 2012, which 
extended compulsory education to 12 years and 
allowed for Imam Hatip schools to be opened and 
“middle school” level (second term of four years) 
experts, warned that the possible increase in the 
number of Imam-Hatip schools was not in line 
with people’s expectations, and described it as 
a “top-down” process. Critics noted that the new 
education system seemed to be a revenge being 
taken for Imam-Hatip schools which were shut 
down after 1997. 
Like so many state institutions in Turkey, 
Imam Hatip schools (Imam Hatip liselerli) were 
initially established to further the top-down secular 
goals of the early republic, but have undergone a 
gradual redefinition ever since. They were opened 
in 1924, with the specific purpose of monopolizing 
religious education in the training prayer leaders 
(imam) and preachers (hatips). Today the Imam 
Hatip curriculum is around 40 percent religious, 
and 60 percent secular, that allowed Imam Hatip 
schools to begin functioning as general high 
schools, not simply as schools for the training 
of religious functionaries.  The expansion of the 
Imam Hatip schools was accelerated after the 
1980 military coup, which was led by generals who 
believed that ignorance about religion had made 
Turkish youth susceptible to radical groups of left 
and right. A “Turkish Islamic synthesis” was thus 
promoted by military authorities, which aim to 
utilize Islam as a socially unifying force (“Islamic 
Schools in”, n.d.). 
Imam Hatip schools  (Imam Hatip liselerli) 
has developed and  increased fivefold in the past 
11 years, with the ruling party of Turkey, the AKP, 
showing that they want to get rid of secular system. 
The number of Imam Hatip schools located across 
the Turkey has risen from 450 to 708 in the 11 
years that the AKP has been in power. It was being 
planned that in the education year of 2013-2014, by 
creating 100 new Imam Hatip schools, this figure 
will reach 808 (“AKP Replaces High Schools”, 
n.d.). Kenan Cayir (2012), an assistant professor 
of Sociology at Istanbul’s Bilgi University, says the 
schools can have a positive impact so that religion 
and modernity can be together. In addition, a survey 
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conducted by the Turkey İmam-Hatip Alumni 
Foundation (TİMAV), titled “Perception of İmam-
Hatip High Schools and İmam-Hatip Students in 
Turkey,” was conducted between April 24 and May 
18, 2012 with 2,689 people in 26 provinces. Most of 
the respondents were not Imam-Hatip graduates. 
The survey shows a majority of the respondents 
hold a positive perception of Imam Hatip students 
and graduates (http://www.todayzaman.com/
columnist/joost-lagendijk,)
In the following time, the progress happened 
in policies on Imam Hatip schools  were that: 
(1) the curriculum were not only contain Islamic 
teachings but also general knowledge, and  (2) the 
graduates were allowed to take further study at any 
discipline of knowledge at any universities. This 
policy was welcomed by most Muslim community 
in Turkey and made Imam Hatip school developed 
very rapidly. Every city and town had an Imam 
Hatip school which had more students than its 
capacity. The students of these schools not only 
become Imams for the mosques, but also enter the 
various faculties of universities.
However, an objection to the free choice 
of Imam Hatip graduates came from   TÜSIAD 
(Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s 
Association). According to their research 
conducted in 1988, approximately 32% of 
graduates of Imam Hatip schools picked faculties 
of law as their first choice in university entrance 
exams, proving more popular than religious 
based alternatives. The report concluded that due 
to fundamental differences in their upbringing, 
Imam Hatip graduates were rendered unsuitable 
for public office. Politicians tended not to agree 
with TÜSIAD’s position. For example, the then 
Minister of National Education, Avni Akyol, 
criticized the report in terms of human rights, 
claiming such proposals undermined the principle 
of equal opportunity in education (“Imam Hatip 
School”, n.d.). 
4. The Transformation of Imam Hatip 
Schools
A broad definition of “education” must 
be adopted when assessing how and by what 
means students learn and grow intellectually and 
spiritually in an Imam Hatip school’s environment. 
Monica Ringer, as Iren Ozgur cited, defines 
education as the body of texts, ideas, and concepts 
transmitted in the educational system and argues 
that education “forms people’s intellectual and 
cultural perspectives, their values systems, and 
their world views” (Ozgur, 2012, p.66). The courses 
at Imam Hatip school consists of vocational, 
cultural and scientific classes. While the ratio of 
professional or religious course is 40%, the ratio 
of cultural and scientific courses is 60%. This 60% 
ratio is composed of the same courses that are 
found on the curriculum of general high schools. 
Thus, the 40% religious or vocational courses are 
additional courses. Therefore education at Imam 
Hatip schools is an amalgam of two elements: 
formal curriculum and experience (Observation 
in Uskudar Imam Hatip schools, September, 25, 
2014).
Formal curriculum denotes the subjects 
which teachers intentionally plan and teach 
to their students in organized and structured 
ways.  Besides, it refers to what students learn 
or are exposed to in classrooms, assemblies, and 
planned school activities (Ozgur, 2012, p. 66). An 
Imam Hatip school education  takes four years 
to complete, during which students take classes 
from a curriculum comprised of secular (beseri) or 
cultural and scientific course and religious (dini) 
or vocational courses. Secular courses, commonly 
known as “cultural and scientific  classes,”  include 
: History, The History of the Republic, National 
security, Geography, Mathemathics, Physics, and 
Turkish Language, Foreign Languages (English, 
French, Germany), Geometry, Trigonometry, 
Geology, Astronomy and Space Science, Chemistry, 
Biology, Computer, Science and Technology, 
Physical Education, Music, Art and Literature. 
Although the majority of cultural and scientific 
courses are compulsory, some of them are optional. 
However, Imam Hatip school students have less 
exposure to the secular curriculum than students 
of general high schools. For example, during his/
her third year, a general high school student takes 
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six hours of history per week, while an Imam Hatip 
school student takes only two hours (Interview 
with Mehmet Toprak, September, 22, 2014)
Courses on religion, commonly known as 
“vocational classes”, enable students to familiarize 
themselves with teachings and principles of Islam. 
The vocational classes  include Qur’an, Arabic, 
Quranic Exegesis (Tefsir), Islamic Jurisprudence 
(Fikih), The Life of Muhammad, the History of 
Religions, Religious Rethoric and Islamic Theology 
(Kelam). The state-directed curriculum is designed 
to emphasize historical rather than contemporary 
forms of Islam and transmit information and 
learning that adheres to the secular values of the 
republic. However, the curriculum still allows 
teachers latitude to teach topics in a manner of 
their choice (Interview with Mehmet Toprak, 
September, 22, 2014).
There are eleven classes in the vocational 
(religion classes) curricula of Imam Hatip schools. 
A first year Imam Hatip school student takes 
twenty hours of vocational classes per week, a 
second year student takes ten, and third and fourth 
year students takes sixteen. Of these eleven classes, 
Arabic and Qur’an classes form of backbone. These 
two classes are the only classes that are required 
every semester, in each of the four years. Imam 
Hatip schools are the only schools that offer Arabic 
as a foreign language in their curricula. In the 
Arabic class I attended, a teacher introduced new 
grammar rules and demonstrated how they were 
applied in sentences. The students would then write 
then write these sentences in their notebooks and 
memorize them (Observation in Uskudar Imam 
Hatip School, September 25, 2014).  Arabic class 
is designed to help students read and understand 
the Qur’an. The Arabic teacher told me that the 
class was meant to cultivate the idea that learning 
Arabic was an essential part of embracing  Islam 
and becoming a religiously conscious individual. 
He said that the class was designed to strengthen 
the students’ ties with religion rather than having 
them engage with Arab culture.
The second element of Imam Hatip curricula is 
“experience” as hidden curriculum. “Experience” 
refers to what students learn by simply being in 
school. The experience side of education includes 
everything that students learn and internalize 
informally or passively through their interactions 
with peers, teachers, and the powerful aesthetic 
and normative environment that surrounds them 
(Ozgur, 2012, p.67). Compared to the formal 
curriculum, the hidden curriculum is not written, 
does not have explicit objectives, and varies 
considerably from one school to another. The 
hidden curriculum is the most powerful influence 
in the classroom and the school generally. Alan 
Skelton defines the hidden curriculum as a set of 
implicit messages relating to knowledge, values, 
norms of behavior and attitudes that learners 
experience in and through educational process 
(Ozgur, 2012).
There are non-curricular (hidden) elements 
that, by adhering to Islamic customs and rituals, 
contribute to the formation of an Imam Hatip school 
experience. These elements refine and reinforce the 
religious consciousness that the schools, through 
their vocational curricula, seek to engender in 
the students. The first of these elements has to do 
with the schools’ social aesthetics. Social scientists 
study aesthetics choices to understand the cultural 
traditions, practices, and behaviors of societies. 
The social aesthetics concern the character itself 
and pervade the entire range of human culture. 
At Imam Hatip schools, social aesthetics can refer 
to the design of buildings and grounds as well as 
the use of space nd clothing (Ozgur, 2012). Imam 
Hatip schools bear distinctive features that set 
them apart from other general high schools. A 
significant number of the Imam Hatip schools, like 
Uskudar, Kartal, and Umraniye Imam Hatip, have 
mosques in their courtyards. Others, like Esatpasa 
and Sariyer Imam Hatip, have mosque in their 
immediate vicinity. In addition, the more common 
practice is to build Imam Hatip schools next to 
existing mosque. Despite the common existence of 
mosques either nearby or on their campuses, most 
Imam Hatip schools also accommodate prayer 
rooms within their main buildings. There are two 
prayers rooms (mescit) in the schools, catering to 
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each gender separately. 
It is arguable that mosques and prayer rooms 
(mescit) allow Imam Hatip school students to pray 
within a congregation and in so doing inculcate 
the importance of performing namaz alongside 
other believers. Most of the Imam Hatip school 
graduates I met said that they attended prayers at 
mosques. 
Today Imam Hatip schools do not only 
produce Imams (leaders of prayer) and hatips 
(deliver khutba at every Friday sermon), but also 
Imam Hatip schools designed to cultivate religious 
sensibilities (dini hassasiyetler) in their students. 
The schools aim to heighten their students’ 
awareness of faith and promote the notion that 
religion should play a substantial role in the life of 
individuals and society (Interview with Mehmet 
Toprak, September, 22, 2014).
Religious sensibilities can refer to a range of 
attitudes, values and practices that have Islamic 
underpinnings. It is a concept used both in speech 
and writing to indicate a level of religiosity that 
affects not only one’s personal and spiritual 
outlook on life, but also his/her behaviors and 
actions toward others in society. Religious 
sensibilities include, but are not limited to, 
elements of faith and worship. To say that a person 
has  religious  sensibilities  broadly  means  that 
he/she is religiously conscious. On the other hand, 
an individual’s sensibility is always comprised of 
many discrete facets (Ozgur, 2012).
The schools integrate religious elements 
into their curricula through either elective 
religion courses or daily religious rituals. Turkish 
secularists often allege that Imam Hatip schools 
create ideologized and politically radicalized 
graduates and that the schools act as the primary 
gents in promoting religious sensibilities. There 
is, however, a difference between assuming that 
religious schools will graduate students who 
are more religious in their personal lives and 
more religiously conscious in their politics, and 
understanding who that religious schools promote 
these results. A closer examination reveals that 
that while the schools endeavor to teach their 
students to observe, uphold, and advocate Islamic 
norms and practices, they do not overtly promote 
political opposition or religious revivalism (Ozgur, 
2012).
On the political socialization of Imam Hatip 
school students, an informant told me “Don’t 
be afraid of people who know religion. Be afraid 
of people who don’t, for it is they who become 
radical Islamists”. (Interview with Mehmet 
Toprak, September 22, 2014). The schools do 
not promote radical Islamism, and inculcation 
of religious sensibilities can put the schools in a 
position to raise generation that can challenge the 
Turkish state’s historically secular ideology. It is 
highly likely that the communities, that is external 
influences and variables around Imam Hatip 
schools in Turkey, are more moderate. Turks 
have a particular interpretation of and approach 
to Islam that is more “liberal” compared to their 
counterparts in other Muslim countries, like 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.
The Imam Hatip schools have expanded 
so much that they are producing many more 
graduates than ever found, such as mosque 
personnel. In fact, many if not most of their 
graduates have no intention whatsoever to just 
become prayer leaders or preachers. The schools 
have turned into something different from what 
their founders intended: schools of preference 
and a channel of upward social mobility for the 
children of an important, conservative segment 
of the population. Many conservative, religious-
minded parents in rural and small town (in central 
and eastern Turkey), sent their children after 
primary school to an Imam Hatip high school. This 
is the only school type where they would study 
Islamic subjects besides the general curriculum, 
and where the teachers were believed to impart 
traditional moral values, much like many parents 
in Europe would prefer a Christian over a neutral 
school. Many of those parents would, however, 
wish their children to pursue modern careers and 
find more prestigious and better paid jobs than 
that of a modest preacher (Interview with Seyfi 
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Kennan, September 15, 2014) 
It should be noted that students who enroll 
in Imam Hatip schools, most of which are in 
the countryside, do not do so necessarily with 
intention of pursuing a religious career. Most of 
these schools are like ordinary schools where one 
gets the education to follow whatever profession 
one may wish to pursue later on. In many cases, 
these are the only schools available to parents in 
the countryside, so they send their children there. 
Of course, many parents also prefer to send their 
children to Imam Hatip schools because these 
schools offer instruction in the religion of Islam 
besides giving a basic education. It should also be 
noted that the buildings of Imam Hatip schools are 
constructed by local community effort, and only 
after their construction does the government hire 
teachers. This shows the real basis of the strength 
of Turkish Islam (Interview with Mehmet Toprak, 
September 25, 2014). 
Today, only 15 percent of the school’s graduates 
become religious functionaries, and the majority 
of Imam Hatip school graduates enter business, 
the practice of law, and politics, and many of 
them fill midle and high level posts in national 
and local government. The growing tendency of 
Imam Hatip school graduates to pursue careers 
outside of the religious realm have put the schools 
at the nexus of debates over Islamism, secularism 
and modernity in Turkey. The country’s secular 
learning and religiously conservative communities 
posses chlassing perspectives about  the schools’ 
role in politics and society (Ozgur, 2012).  But the 
most important is that Imam Hatip schools play 
an important role in Turkey’s pious community 
and making the country more Islamic.
The fact that the president of Republic of 
Turkey and many leading figures of the AKP, the 
ruling party, are Imam Hatip school graduates 
is of profound significance because it reinforces 
the perception that they are good Muslims and 
highlights the schools as successful models for 
Islamic education. Scholars and journalists have 
named Imam Hatip schools as potential building 
blocks for an international network of “moderate” 
Islamic educational instructions. They have noted 
how the schools equip students for entry into a 
wide range of professions in international markets 
and regional politics. 
Ziauddin Sardar, a contemporary Muslim 
scholar,  argued that the establishment of Imam 
Hatip schools, where Islamic studies are combined 
with modern scientific thought, and the emergence 
of a contemporary school of young intellectuals, 
who are concerned  with issues of justice  and 
equity, science and values (the epistemological 
basis of Muslim civilization and ecological and 
environmental problems) is an indication that in 
the next decade Turkey will become intellectually 
the most exciting country in the Muslim world. 
(http://www.salam.co.uk/knowledge/inquiry3.
php).
The transformation of Imam Hatip schools, 
from only vocational school to general and 
vocational high school is powerful influenced by 
the ruling politics party. Currently, AKP (Adalet 
ve Kalkinma Partisi) or Justice and Development 
Party is the ruling party in Turkey with Recep 
Tayib Erdogan as the president of Turkey at 
present. He was a student of Imam Hatip school, 
called as Imam Hatipli. AKP and Erdogan had 
good policy for the advancement of Imam Hatip 
schools. The experience of what can be described 
as an intriguing and dynamic relationship between 
politics and religious education since the birth of 
Republic achieved major progress, despite its up 
and down, during the last 80 years.
D. CONCLUSION
The development of Imam Hatip schools is 
very powerful and influenced by the development 
of social and political condition of Turkey. 
Therefore, the existence Imam Hatip schools is 
determined by and very depending on the ruling 
party in Turkey, the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP: Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi).
State of Turkey (Ministry of National 
Education) grants permission for operation of 
Imam Hatip Schools (Turkish: Imam Hatip 
Lisesi), appoints their teachers, and designs their 
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curricula. Imam Hatip Schools are Islamic Schools 
that provide the most prominent exception to the 
rule of secular education in Turkey. The courses 
at Imam Hatip schools consist of vocational, 
cultural and scientific classes. While the ratio of 
professional or religious course is 40%, the ratio 
of cultural and scientific courses is 60%. This 60% 
ratio is composed of the same courses that are 
found on the curriculum of general high schools. 
Thus, the 40% religious or vocational courses are 
additional courses. Therefore, education at Imam 
Hatip schools is an amalgam of two elements: 
formal curriculum and hidden curriculum 
(experience). The hidden curriculum is the most 
powerful influence in the classroom and the school 
generally. The hidden curriculum as a set of implicit 
messages relating to knowledge, values, norms of 
behavior and attitudes that learners experience in 
and through educational process.
The majority of Imam Hatip School students 
come from families who live and conduct their 
relations in accordance with Islamic norms and 
principles. Many conservative, religious-minded 
parents in rural and small town (in central and 
eastern Turkey) sent their children after primary 
school to an Imam Hatip High school, because this 
is the only school type where  they would study 
Islamic subjects besides the general curriculum 
and where the teachers  were believed to impart 
traditional moral values. Many of those parents 
would, however, wish their children to pursue 
modern careers and find more prestigious and 
better paid jobs than that of a modest preacher.
Today Imam Hatip schools do not only 
produce Imams (leader of prayer) and hatips 
(deliver khutba at Friday sermon), but also design 
to cultivate religious sensibilities in their students. 
The schools aim to heighten their students 
awareness of faith and promote the notion that 
religion should play a substantial role in the life 
of individuals and society. The most important is 
that Imam Hatip schools play an important role 
in Turkey’s pious community  and making the 
country more Islamic.
In the following time, the progress happened in 
policies on Imam Hatip schools: (1) the curriculum 
were not only contain Islamic teachings but also 
general knowledge, and  (2) the graduates were 
allowed to take further study at any discipline of 
knowledge at any universities. This policy was 
welcome by most Muslim conmunity in Turkey 
and made Imam Hatip Schools developed very 
rapidly. Every city and town had an Imam Hatip 
school that had more students than its capacity. 
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